IN his presidential address at the beginning of this session, Dr. Bernard Hart' gave a survey of the modern fields of medical psychology and emphasized the possible good that might accrue from the employment of every kind of research or inquiry known to psychologists. He did not, however, have much to say concerning the confusion that might result from the simultaneous employment of these different lines of approach, each with its own theoretical background and its own terminology.
understanding will never be realized unless an effort is made to use terms in an unambiguous fashion, and until the writers of textbooks and manuals present psychology as a more united whole than they hitherto have done. A brief survey of the fields of psychology will be attempted in this paper, giving examples of some of these sources of confusion and misunderstanding, viewing these difficulties from the angle of the average general reader who does not aspire to become an advanced technician.
The psychology of a hundred years ago was almost entirely based upon the results of the study of consciousness by means of introspection, and it is the gradual introduction of newer methods that has led to a growing dissatisfaction with its findings and finally to the formation of the modern "schools." Perhaps the most direct offspring of the older psychologies is the " existential " school of Titchener, in which the central object of study and starting point of syDthesis is sensation. The strength of the school owes a good deal to the adoption of a similar point of view by the neo-realist philosophers.
Another group of psychologists, having relinquished the position that psych:logy is the science of "mind," have conceived psychology as the science of " behaviour." Some of these have retained the concept of consciousness and admit the value of introspection, but the extremists have totally rejected both consciousness and introspection, and have founded the school of Behavioutrism. This approach dates from the older animal psychologies and is based on Pavlov's findings concerning conditioned reflexes, so that all behaviour comes to be expressed in purely objective terms and regarded as the result of the conditioning and deconditioning of a few innate patterns of responses.
At the same time an attack was launched against the tendency for interpreting all higher mental processes as a mere integration of lower ones, such as the explanation of perception as an aggregate of sensations. This has led to the " Gestalt" school, the corner stone of which is the study of perception. This school insists that perception must be regarded as a whole, that in all perception there is an appreciation of" wholeness," a recognition of something belonging to the situation " as a whole," which is not recognizable in the simpler parts (sensations) of which other schools say perception is composed. Furthermore certain wholes, certain configurations or "sets " are so frequently found in perception, that they are actually sought for and imagined even in those situations which do not contain them, as when a certain type of curved line is perceived as an " incomplete circle " or another figure is recognized as a "truncated cone." Neither a circle nor a cone is actually seen, yet the perception is described in terms of imagined wholes or sets.
Finally another group of psychologists find their major theme in the interpretation of behaviour in terms of purpose. It is in this school that we find all psychology based on the assumption of certain fundamental trends, inherited urges, that are purposive and guide the animal towards a goal of successful adaptation and survival.
As an example of such a "hormic" psychology may be mentioned McDougall's, with its elaborate instinct theories.
We have four main streams of thought, in which we find the principal emphasis laid on sensation, perception, reflexes, and purpose, respectively. Unless the student can find sure means of linking up with one another these several distinct schools he will not be able to avoid a considerable amount of confusion. However, the "Gestalt" psychologists have shown how we make use of sets or configurations in making goals for ourselves, how our aims are formulated in terms of " wholes," and when they are thus stressing the function of our concepts of wholeness in our strivings, they are really only discussing purpose, the kind of purpose that looms so large in the hormic psychologies, although they do so from a different angle. We have here a meeting-ground of these two schools. Again, "Gestalt " psychology has shown the function of insight (as based on an appreciation of situations as a whole) in the solving of problems by animals, and in doing so has attempted to oppose the trial and error theory of the strict behaviourists. But there is a section of behaviourists, headed by Lashley, who are also casting doubt on the trial and error view by proving how an animal is often conditioned not so much for one particular stimulus as for one of several stimuli; in other words the animal's response often depends on the appreciation of the difference between stimuli: again an example of recognizing the "situation as a whole," a link between behaviourism and Gestalt. Further, some behaviourists recognize instinct as more than mere chain reflexes, as evincing purpose, thus standing midway between original behavourism and hormic psychology. Lastly, though many still deny consciousness and introspection, others maintain at least a non-committal attitude.
In connection with the word purpose there is the ever-present source of confusion in its double sense. From a mechanistic, causal point of view, purpose is merely the result of the events preceding it; but regarded teleologically, purpose is also a cause of the events leading up to its realization. It would therefore be of no little help if we used the adjective purposive-as Lloyd Morgan does-to denote purpose viewed from the causal, mechanistic angle, reserving the term purposeful for the final, teleological meaning, the meaning that implies the presence of that purpose in the mind of some agent or doer; in fact, purpose as a necessary part of a " dramatic" explanation of events.
McDougall's outlook on purpose is intimately bound up with his views on instinct, and here we find several difficulties productive of confusion. Thus the position of emotion in his scheme is not always clear, and many other writers regard emotion as distinct from instinct and possessed of a dynamic force of its own. Further, whereas McDougall describes many inherited tendencies, some of the experimental schools, for example, behaviourism, find very few innate patterns of response, at least in the unconditioned infant. But more important still is the fact that the accounts usually given of McDougall's instinct theories seem to imply that in absence of specific stimuli a given instinct will remain dormant. Now this is in direct opposition to those other " hormic" schools-the analytical-who insist that even in absence of stimuli an instinct leads to states of tension, of need, a condition of internal unrest that will urge the animal to seek those stimuli that will determine action of the desired kind. This has been expressed in neurological terms in that " psychopathology of the autonomic " which is based on a synthesis of Watson, Pavlov, Freud, Jung and Adler, and which we owe to Kempf.
Misunderstandings may also arise from the fact that whereas McDougall's "instincts " are numerous the "analytical " ones are, at the most, three (ego, sex, and herd) and even to regard the latter as three groups of instincts does not help matters much. Lastly, the instincts of McDougall are classed in accordance witlh the immediate acts to which they prompt, whereas the three analytical urges are described in relation to the ultimate results that they achieve. In fact, the more one considers these broad analytical urges, the more does one realize that they are largely intelligent as well as instinctive, and that the very fact of their aiming for ultimate goals instead of immediate ones is due to the intelligent capacity for overcoming difficulties by means of thought and foresight. Although the exact relation between instinct and intelligence is debatable, one can yet reasonably suggest that the analytical instincts resemble far less what McDougall would call an instinct than those more complex trends that Shand terms sentiments. Indeed, these ego, sex, and herd tendencies of the analytical schools seem to correspond even more closely to what Morton Prince has called systems. Another term, the meaning of which is seldom made clear by writers of textbooks, is intuition. Every definition has been given it, from "supernatural cognition" to "instinctive knowledge." More recently it has been regarded by Dibblee as an extra-conscious epicritic and therefore cortical, function in the nature of unconscious thought, a view based largely on the work of Head and Rivers.
Having mentioned Rivers we might add that in his work numerous examples of the confusing use of terms may be found. Thus, he employs the word suggestion, just as the French writers use imitation, to include the "suggestion," the "sympathy" and the " imitation " of McDougall. Matters are worse still in connection with repression, as Rivers applied it to what is now termed suppression, wvhile using suppression to denote Freud's repression.
Repression may lead to dissociation; but it is not always clear that dissociation as understood by Freud or even, say, Morton Prince, is a dynamic process dependent on the expenditure of energy on the part of a repressing-force"; on the other hand, the dissociation described by Janet is explained by the latter as due to a, diminution of energy, a weakening of the synthesizing forces."
Another result of repression is the formation of a complex. This term is used to denote a repressed and buried system of emotions and thoughts (or " constellation,"
to use Jung's term), but one often finds the word employed so as to include conscious as well as unconscious constellations. In the latter case, complex becomes practically synonymous with sentiment, or even the " system ' of Prince, and it is easy to appreciate the misunderstanding that may result from thus giving such an extended meaning to the word. The theory of repression involves such concepts as libido, ego, super-ego, id, fixation, etc., and one cannot discuss these without entering a special technical field.
The term ego was used in older philosophies with a mystical or transcendental meaning but it has come to be identified with the "self" of self-psychologists. And 'although the psycho-analytical use of the word is a very different one, it is not unusual for some-of the less orthodox writers to evince a hybrid conception of the ego, one that superficially satisfies the demands of psycho-analysis, while at bottom being more in keeping with the tenets of self-psychology. Again the distinctions to be drawn between super-ego, ego-ideal and conscience, are often overlooked. The main difficulty in connection with libido is due to the unfortunate fact that JuDg elected to apply it to all instinctive trends, instead of limiting it, as Freud does, to only a group of them. Whether Jung's collective unconscious will ever-be linked up with some enlarged conception of the psycho-analytic id is hard to say. Jung's use of the word rational may also be misleading as it does not merely denote "reasoned " or "thought out "; it is used to describe all mental processes that are discriminating and involve a process of " evaluation," in contrast to that type of adaptation that is not discriminating, but empirical. The meaning of introvert, too, is at times evidently misunderstood, as one finds in the manuals of psychiatry a growing tendency for using introvert as another word for ego-centric or self-absorbed, the r6le of subjectivity and of the collective unconscious in the production of introvertion being lost sight of.
Many other examples of confusing terms could be discussed, such as unconscious and co-conscious, conflict, regression, personality, character, all of which are used in several different ways. Enough instances have been given to support a plea for a better consideration of the needs of the general student who aims at some understanding of several schools. The solution of tnese difficulties is not easy, but three suggestions can reasonably be made. Firstly, writers of textbooks should avoid attempting to convert the reader to one exclusive point of view. They should give a comprehensive and unbiased survey of the field, underlining the possible links between the various schools. Any fusion attempted between different points of view should be based on real understanding rather than on the confusion resulting from a lack of courage in facing terminological difficulties. Then, terms coined by a particular author should subsequently be used only in the sense intended by him. Lastly, any change in the delineation of a term should be in the direction of narrowing rather than enlarging it; as a result our terminologies would gain much in both clarity and conciseness. [April 12, 1932.] The Place of Psychology in the Medical Curriculum.
By DAVID FORSYTH, M.D ., D.Sc. THE subject of this paper has often been discussed since it was raised by Dr.
Bernard Hart in 19181. It was dealt with by Sir George Newman in a memorandum to the Ministry of Health in 19232, and was reported on by a committee of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association in 19293. Nevertheless, it can, I think, be profitably reconsidered at the present time.
Perhaps I should first explain how it is bhat one who is a general physician should discuss this topic. For many years psychology has been my chief interest. I recall my dissatisfaction as a student with the teaching given us, good though it was so far as it went, in that it failed to take into account the psvchological aspect of clinical cases. After qualifying I had planned to enter the asylum service; I had been attracted by the adminstrative efficiency of asylums, but found myself more strongly repelled by the lack of scientific basis to the clinical work, and I felt that to live under these conditions would, psychologically speaking, mean intellectual death. Later I found myself on the staff of a teaching hospital, and in a few years more my disappointment with mental diseases was more than compensated by my coming upon psycho-analysis. This gave me at once the scientific satisfaction which I had failed to find in psychiatry, and set my chief interest permanently in the direction of psychology. For nearly twenty years now I have been regularly giving psychoanalytical teaching on neurotic and psycho-neurotic cases in my out-patient departments and wards, as well as several courses of lectures on psycho-analysis to students, the first of these being in 1919. During this time I have had ample opportunity to become familiar with the position of psychology in a teaching hospital, with the needs of both patients and students, and with the attitude of hospital physicians and
